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Abstract
Determining the causes of instability and contagion in financial networks is necessary to
inform policy and avoid future financial collapse.
In the American Economic Review, Elliott, Golub and Jackson proposed a simple model for
capturing the dynamics of complex financial networks. In Elliott, Golub and Jackson’s model,
the institutions in the network are connected by linear dependencies (cross-holdings) and if any
institution’s value drops below a critical threshold, its value suffers an additional failure cost.
This work shows that even in this simple model there are fundamental barriers to understanding
the risks that are inherent in a network.
First, if institutions are not required to maintain a minimum amount of self-holdings, any
change in investments by a single institution can have an arbitrarily magnified influence on the
net worth of the institutions in the system. This implies that if institutions have small self-
holdings, then estimating the market value of an institution requires almost perfect information
about every cross-holding in the system.
Second, Even if a regulator has complete information about all cross-holdings in the system,
it may be computationally intractable to estimate the number of failures that could be caused
by a small shock to the system.
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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis and subsequent bailout have highlighted the need for a better understand-
ing of the dynamics of financial networks. Indeed, the complexity of modern financial networks has
been blamed for our collective failure to recognize the presence of serious risks in these systems.
In this work, we show that even in extremely simple financial networks understanding the risk
present in the system is computationally intractable in general – even in the presence of perfect
information about all participants in the system. We hope that these insights will help regulators
and policymakers to better understand the dynamics of financial networks.
Understanding an individual’s risk in a financial network is a difficult task, because an insti-
tution’s ability to fulfill its outgoing financial obligations is not a local property, i.e., it cannot
be understood by examining a single individual in isolation. An institution’s ability to make its
outgoing payments may depend on whether its incoming payments are made by its debtors, which
in turn may depend on whether the incoming obligations are made to those institutions, etc. Thus
each institution, acting without a global view of the network, cannot effectively understand its
risk. Nevertheless, one might hope that a regulator, with a global view of the network could better
understand the opportunities and risks inherent in the system.
Even with a global view, the situation remains relatively complex. One complicating factor is
the existence of cycles in the financial network, for example institution A may have obligations to
institution B which has obligations to institution C, which in turn has obligations to institution
A. The existence of these cyclical interdependencies has been put forward as one of the primary
sources of complexity into financial networks. In this work, we will examine network dynamics in
both cyclic (Theorem 1) and acyclic networks (Theorem 3).
One of the driving forces in the study of financial networks is their ability to magnify risk: if an
institution, A, defaults on its obligations to institution B, this may cause institution B to default
on its obligations to institution C etc. The spread of risk through a financial network is known as
financial contagion and has been carefully modeled and studied [AG00, EN01, GHM12, AOTS13,
GY14, EGJ14].
This work focuses on quantifying the ability of financial networks to amplify and conceal risk.
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2 Our contributions
In this work, we study two questions related to the stability of financial networks. First, we look at
how sensitive market valuations can be to small changes in network structure. Second, we examine
the computational complexity of determining how far a given network is from a massive failure.
Throughout this work we use the network model put forward by [EGJ14]. In this model, financial
institutions own shares of underlying assets, and the institutions are connected by cross-holdings,
which are modeled as linear dependencies. If an institution’s market value drops below a certain
critical threshold, its value suffers a further discontinuous shock, modeling the effects of a loss of
investor confidence, or the failure to pay everyday operating costs. See [EGJ14] for an in-depth
discussion of the interpretation and real-world validity of this model. The formal mathematical
model is described in detail in Section 4.
Our first result (Theorem 2), shows that financial networks can be highly sensitive to small
changes in their link structure. Concretely, we show that if a single institution changes a single
cross-holding by ǫ, the market values of institutions in the system can change by as much as ǫ/2r,
where r ≤ 1 is the minimum amount of self-holdings of the institutions in the network. The
minimum self-holdings, r, is a measure of integration of the network, where r = 0 corresponds to
a fully integrated network, and r = 1 corresponds to a network with no integration. This result
shows that if each institution retains only, say, 5% self-ownership, a change in a single holding by ǫ
can result in a 20ǫ change in an institution’s market value. This amplification is directly caused by
cycles in the network, and in acyclic networks this type of magnification cannot occur (see Lemma
1). Our bounds are essentially tight, and Theorems 1 and 2, show that the true sensitivity is in
fact Θ (ǫ/r).
This sensitivity magnification has many consequences. First, it means that in order to esti-
mate market values of institutions within the system, all cross-holdings need to be known to an
extremely high degree of precision. Investors or regulators who wish to calculate market values
can be extremely far off if even a single cross-holding in the network remains unknown to them.
Second, because small changes in a single institution’s investments can have large effects on mar-
ket values throughout the system, this indicates a potential for extreme instability in the system
as a whole; the small portfolio changes in one institution can have a drastically magnified effect
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market values of other institutions, and so small changes by a myopic institution could topple even
seemingly stable institutions. Third, this extreme sensitivity means that calculating market values
in a privacy-preserving manner can be extremely difficult [NPH14]. This is the flip-side of the first
point, in order to calculate market values for institutions in the system, all the interbank holdings
need to be known with high precision, which means that revealing market prices has the potential
to reveal extremely detailed information about each institution’s interbank holdings.
Our second result addresses the question of how well a regulator can assess the stability of a
network. Suppose a regulator or oversight agency is presented with a network in which every bank
is solvent, and suppose the regulator believes that the underlying assets cannot drop in value by
more than some fixed amount d. What is the maximum number of failures that can be caused
by a drop of this size in asset values? We emphasize that in this scenario, the regulator has
complete information about the entire structure of the financial network, and the only uncertainty
is in which specific assets may decline in value. We show calculating the number of institutions
that can fail in a network is NP-Hard. In particular, we show that is as hard as calculating the
maximum balanced clique in a bipartite graph (Theorem 3). The maximum balanced bipartite
subgraph (BCBS) problem is NP-hard [GJ79, Joh87], and there is evidence that it is even hard
to approximate. It is known that if 3-SAT is not in DTIME
(
2n
3/4+ǫ
)
for some ǫ, then there is
no polynomial time algorithm for calculating the maximum balanced clique to within a factor of
2(log n)
δ
for some δ > 0. [FK04] go further, conjecturing that there is no polynomial time algorithm
to approximate the maximum balanced bipartite clique to within a factor of nδ for some δ > 0.
This would imply that there is no polynomial time algorithm that can even estimate the maximum
number of failures caused by a drop in asset values of a given magnitude to within a factor of nδ in
a network with 2n institutions. In particular, this means that there are financial networks where
stress testing (which is inherently computationally feasible) cannot hope to even approximate the
magnitude of collapse that could be caused by some bounded drop in asset values.
Unlike our first result, which crucially relies on cycles in the network, this result holds even
in acyclic networks: even when there are no cycles it is computationally intractable to estimate
the maximum number of failures that could be caused by a bounded drop in asset values. This
complexity arises not from cycles, but from the nonlinear dynamics that occur when a bank drops
below its critical threshold value.
5
3 Previous Work
Many different models have been proposed to study financial networks, and specifically models of
stability and contagion.
Allen and Gale [AG98] considered a model consisting of depositors and banks. Depositors de-
posit their money in the banks, and the banks must choose between making short-term investments
or long-term investments. This model has three time periods, t = 0, 1, 2. At t = 0, investments are
made, at t = 1 short-term investments pay off, and depositors choose whether to withdraw their
money, and at time t = 2 long-term investments pay off. The banks’ investment strategies then
depend on the probability that depositors withdraw their money at time t = 1. In a follow-up work
[AG00] introduced a network component, whereby banks can exchange deposits with each other in
an effort to mitigate risk, and they showed simple contagion effects in this model.
Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi [AOTS13] build on Allen and Gale’s 3 time-step model.
At time t = 0 banks can make a short-term investment, a long-term investment or loan money to
other banks. Long term investments yield a fixed return at t = 2. Long term investments that are
liquidated at t = 1 receive a return that is randomly distributed between two values. Banks whose
investments returned the lower of the two values were said to have received a shock. Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi considered how two extremal types of networks serve to propagate
these shocks. They considered the ring (where each bank only has debts to its two neighbors) and
the complete network where each bank’s debts are spread to all other banks, as well as all convex
combinations of these two. They showed that if the magnitude of the shocks are small then the
complete network is more stable and resilient than the ring, and if the magnitudes of the shock
are large enough then both the ring and complete networks are the least stable networks, thus
the complete network exhibits a phase transition, moving from the most stable to the least stable
network as the magnitude of the shocks increase.
Eisenberg and Noe [EN01] developed a very simple and appealing network model where each
bank has cash reserves and fixed debts to other banks. Eisenberg and Noe’s work focused on
showing that (under some basic restrictions on the network) there is always a unique clearing
vector (indicating how much of its debts each bank pays to its creditors), and they gave a linear
program and simple iterative algorithm for calculating this clearing vector and hence the equilibrium
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valuation of each bank.
Gai and Kapadia [GK10] considered a modification of Eisenberg and Noe’s network model,
forcing all incoming edges to have the same weight, but allowed banks to have additional illiquid
assets. Gai and Kapadia then considered the question of how a single bank failure propagates
through a network. For this analysis, they considered different models for generating the underlying
graph topology, and plotted contagion effects for different network models characterized by their
degree distribution. They found that a single large shock could have devastating effects on the
network, but that this was highly dependent on where in the network the shock hit.
Gourieroux, Heam and Monfort [GHM12] considered a model that allows interbank investment
via shares (like [EGJ14]) and lending or insurance (like [EN01]). Unlike [EGJ14], they do not
introduce discontinuous failure costs. Gourieroux, He´am and Monfort extend Eisenberg and Noe’s
uniqueness results to show that (under mild constraints on the network) this extended model has
a unique equilibrium value for all institutions. They then examined the effects of exogenous shocks
on the network (i.e., drops in asset values) using synthetic data and data obtained from the French
banking sector.
Morris [Mor00] studied contagion in local interaction systems. In that model, each node repre-
sents a player, and each player engages in a local game with each of its neighbors. Morris focused
on the case where each player has a binary strategy space, {0, 1}, and there is a global 2× 2 payoff
matrix, such that for each edge in the graph, the two neigboring players receive a payoff accord-
ing to this global payoff matrix. In that model, a strategy is said to be “contagious,” if it can
spread from a finite set of players to an infinite set of players by the best-response dynamics of the
underlying local game.
The notion of failure cascades and contagion have also been studied in the computer science
literature by [BEK+11]. Blume et al. considered general cascades in graphs where the edges were
unweighted and a node was said to fail if some critical threshold of its neighbors failed. By choosing
all edges to have equal weight, and choosing each institution’s failure threshold carefully, the failure
model of [EGJ14] can be made to overlap with this general network failure model.
In this work, we use the model of [EGJ14]. In this model, institutions can own shares in each
other, or in “primitive assets” that have intrinsic value outside of the network. The model is ex-
plained in detail in the next section. Elliott, Golub and Jackson introduced this model to help
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analyze and understand contagion effects in networks. Because a cascade of collapse requires an
initial failure, Elliott, Golub and Jackson began by showing that the weakest institution can never
be made strictly more stable by any fair trade between the institutions. Next they examined the
contagion dynamics in a wide class of networks parametrized by “integration” and “diversifica-
tion.” Integration increases as institutions in the network increase their inter-network holdings,
i.e., integration increases as the percentage of each institution owned by shareholders external to
the network decreases. As integration increases, the institutions fates are more closely tied to-
gether. Diversification measures how risk is spread within the network. Diversification increases
as institutions increase their number of cross-holdings. Neither integration nor diversification have
strictly positive or negative effects on network stability, but instead have slightly more complex
non-monotonic effects.
The notion of computational complexity has been studied in the context of financial products
by Arora et al. who showed that banks can create derivatives that are computational intractable to
price accurately [ABBG10, ABBG11]. The result of Arora et al. crucially relies on the information
asymmetry between the institution the seller (who creates the derivatives) and the buyer who
only sees their resulting composition. Braverman and Pasricha [BP14] show that even in the full
information setting pricing compound options is PSPACE complete.
4 Model
We use the model put forward by [EGJ14]. In this model there are n financial institutions, these can
be viewed as countries, banks or private firms, and m underlying assets, that can be viewed as any
object or project with intrinsic value. The financial institutions own shares of the underlying assets
which impart value into the system. The values of the institutions themselves are interconnected
via a network (modeled as a weighted, directed graph). The interdependencies (cross-holdings)
between the institutions are modeled as simple linear dependencies. These linear cross-holdings
can model simple equity stakes (one institution owning shares in another) or they can be viewed as
an approximation of more complicated debt contracts between the institutions (see [EGJ14, Section
2.5] for a more thorough discussion of the validity and generality of this model).
Although institutions invest in one another, all value in the system originates from the under-
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lying assets. The price of asset k is denoted by pk, and we use Dik ≥ 0 to denote the percentage of
asset k owned by institution i. The n×m matrix of ownership is denoted by D = (Dik).
We define C = (Cij) to be the n× n matrix indicating the cross-holdings of institutions. Thus
institution i owns a Cij fraction of institution j. It will be be useful to view the network of cross-
holdings as a directed graph with n nodes representing the financial institutions, and an edge from
institution j to i of weight Cij whenever Cij > 0. Following [EGJ14], we set Cii = 0 for all i. Now,∑
iCij is the fraction of institution j that is owned by institutions external to j. The remainder,
the amount of self-ownership, is denoted by Cˆjj
def
= 1 −
∑
iCij. The matrix Cˆ will be a diagonal
matrix with Cˆii on the diagonal.
As noted by [BBC89], this type of model introduces two types of valuations, the equity valuation
(~V ) and the market valuation (~v). The equity valuation of institution i is denoted by
Vi =
∑
k
Dikpk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Value of assets held by i
+
∑
j
CijVj
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Values of institutions held by i
(1)
In matrix notation, this becomes ~V = D~p+C~V which implies ~V = (I−C)−1D~p. The matrix
I−C is guaranteed to be invertible because we assume that Cˆjj > 0, so the column sums of C are
all strictly less than one (see Lemma 2). In fact, the matrix I−C, is an M-Matrix [PB74], and so
(I−C)−1 is an inverse M-Matrix, about which many properties are known [Wil77, Joh82].
This equity valuation significantly overvalues the institutions. In particular, we can see that
‖~V ‖1 ≥ ‖~p‖1, so the total value of the institutions in the system will (in general) be much larger
than the total value of the underlying assets. This occurs because each asset counts towards the
equity value of the institution that owns it and also to the institutions that have an equity stake
in the asset’s owner. The network’s inflation of equity values is well-known and validated both
theoretically and empirically [FP91, FHT94].
To find an institution’s market value, we must scale the institution’s equity value by the percent
stake it has in itself, thus the market value of institution i is vi = CˆiiVi, so the market values are
the solution to the system
~v = Cˆ~V = Cˆ(I−C)−1D~p (2)
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The matrix C is column sub-stochastic because column i sums to 1− Cˆii. The system can also
be viewed as a flow, where at each time step money flows between banks according to the link
structure of the network (see Appendix A).
5 Sensitivity
Our first result concerns concerns the sensitivity of valuations to small changes in the structure
of the network. Suppose a single institution shifts its holdings by a small quantity, ǫ, how much
can this small change affect the market valuations in the network? This question is motivated
by questions about network stability, and the possibility of privacy-preserving oversight. If small
changes in network holdings can lead to large changes in the market values of the institutions,
this indicates a fundamental instability in the financial network. Additionally, if small changes
in interbank holdings can lead to large changes in market values, then any attempt at financial
oversight must know all the interbank holdings to a high degree of accuracy in order to predict
market values.
A high sensitivity also has implications towards privately computing network statistics. Flood
et al. [FKOS13] proposed using tools from differential privacy [Dwo06, DMNS06] to provide a
means of computing global network characteristics while preserving the privacy of each individual
institution’s holdings. A high sensitivity implies a worse trade-off between privacy and accuracy
when calculating network statistics.
We begin our sensitivity analysis with a simple observation: if the total value of the underlying
assets is ‖~p‖, then an ǫ change in holdings can easily change the market valuations by ǫ‖~p‖ (see
Figure 1). We show that if the network is acyclic, then this is the largest change possible, but if
there are cycles in the network, the sensitivity can be much larger.
Throughout this section, we use r (for “reserve”) to measure the fraction of each institution held
by investors outside the system.1 We define r = mini Cˆii. Using the terminology of [EGJ14], r is
just a concrete metric of the integration of the network, and integration increases as r → 0. Another
interpretation of reserve is the discrepancy between equity valuation (~V ) and market valuation (~v).
1The reserve, or self-holdings, can be viewed as the amount of an institution that is not sold, or is held by private
shareholders, who retain complete ownership of themselves. These private shareholders buy shares of institutions in
the network, but no entity in the network owns shares of the private shareholders.
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1B1 B2
1
1 11− ǫ
ǫ
Figure 1: An ǫ change results in an ǫ‖~p‖ change in market values. Banks are in blue, external
shareholders are in green, and the asset is shown in red. In this example D~p =
[
1
0
]
, and C = 0.
Thus ~v =
[
1
0
]
. Changing C to C˜ =
[
0 ǫ
0 0
]
leads to a valuation of ~˜v =
[
1− ǫ
ǫ
]
, thus the
market valuation of B2 changes by ǫ‖~p‖.
Since ~v = Cˆ ~V , we have that r = mini
vi
Vi
.
5.1 Sensitivity in acyclic networks
We begin by noting that in the acyclic case, there is a strong bound on each institution’s equity
valuation, i.e., the equity valuation cannot be too much larger than the market valuation.
Lemma 1. If the banking network has no cycles, then every institution’s equity valuation is at
most ‖~p‖1 where ~p is the vector of asset values.
Proof. Organize the financial network into layers, so that each institution only owns shares of
institutions at lower layers. Thus institutions at level 1 do not have any cross-holdings, they only
own the underlying assets. This means that the incoming edges to level one carry a total weight of
at most ‖~p‖1. By adding fictitious institutions that pass on all of their incoming wealth, we can also
ensure that every institution only owns shares in the entities at the preceding level, i.e., institutions
at level i only own shares in institutions (or fictitious institutions) at level i− 1.
Now each institution’s equity value is the sum of the values on all incoming edges. Since outgoing
edges carry a value that is a percentage of equity value, the sum of the values on each institution’s
outgoing edges is at most the sum of the values on its incoming edges. (For real institutions the
outgoing sum will be strictly less because the reserve rate r > 0, but for the fictitious institutions
it can be exactly equal.)
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Now, the sum of the values coming into layer 1 is at most the sum of the assets, ‖~p‖1. Thus the
outgoing edges from level 1 to level 2 carry a total weight of at most ‖~p‖1. Proceeding inductively
through the levels, we see that the sum of the values on the incoming edges at level i is at most
‖~p‖1. Thus the equity value of all the institutions on level i is at most ‖~p‖1 and in particular the
equity value of any given institution is at most ‖~p‖1.
Corollary 1. If the banking network is acyclic, and one edge changes by at most ǫ, then no
institution’s market value can change by more than ǫ‖~p‖1.
Proof. Since each institution’s equity value is at most ‖~p‖1, an ǫ change in any edge corresponds
to an absolute change of at most ǫ‖~p‖1.
5.2 Sensitivity in general networks
In this section, we explore how much the market valuations can change when one bank changes its
holdings by a small amount in the presence of cycles in the network graph. We begin by showing
an upper bound on the change in market valuations that depends on the minimum self-ownership
(Cˆii) of the institutions. For our upper bound, we do not require changes to occur in the holdings of
a single bank. Instead, we allow any change in network structure, as long as the total (ℓ1) change
is bounded by ǫ. Formally, this means that we have two network matrices C and C˜ such that
‖C − C˜‖ ≤ ǫ, and we would like to bound how much the market valuations can change between
these two situations. Because we are showing an upper bound, allowing more general perturbations
only strengthens our result.
Theorem 1. If ‖C − C˜‖ < ǫ, then ‖~v − ~˜v‖ < ǫ
r
‖D~p‖, where r = mini(
˜ˆ
Cii, Cˆii) is the minimum
reserve or “self-holdings” of the financial institutions. In addition, it is always true that ‖~v − ~˜v‖ ≤
2 ‖D~p‖, thus
‖~v − ~˜v‖
‖D~p‖
≤ min
( ǫ
r
, 2
)
Proof. Let C˜ = C+E, and ˆ˜C = Cˆ+ Eˆ. By hypothesis ‖E‖+ ‖Eˆ‖ < ǫ. Then we have
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ˆ˜
C(I− C˜)−1 − Cˆ(I−C)−1 =
[
(Cˆ+ Eˆ)− Cˆ(I−C)−1(I − C˜)
]
(I − C˜)−1
=
[
(Cˆ+ Eˆ)− Cˆ(I−C)−1(I −C−E)
]
(I− C˜)−1
=
[
(Cˆ+ Eˆ)− Cˆ(I− (I−C)−1E)
]
(I− C˜)−1
=
[
Eˆ+ Cˆ(I−C)−1E
]
(I− C˜)−1
Now, we notice that
∥∥∥(I− C˜)−1∥∥∥ =
∥∥∥∥∥
∞∑
k=0
C˜k
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤
∞∑
k=0
∥∥∥C˜k∥∥∥ ≤ ∞∑
k=0
(1− r)k =
1
r
Because money is never created or destroyed, we have
∥∥∥Cˆ(I−C)−1~v∥∥∥
1
= ‖~v‖1
Thus we have
∥∥∥ ˆ˜C(I− C˜)−1 − Cˆ(I−C)−1∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥[Eˆ+ Cˆ(I−C)−1E] (I − C˜)−1∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥Eˆ∥∥∥ · ∥∥∥(I − C˜)−1∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥Cˆ(I−C)−1∥∥∥ · ‖E‖ · ∥∥∥(I− C˜)−1∥∥∥
Thus we immediately get the bound
∥∥∥ ˆ˜C(I− C˜)−1 − Cˆ(I−C)−1∥∥∥ ≤ ǫ
r
Since
∥∥∥Cˆ(I−C)−1∥∥∥ ≤ 1, we also have the trivial bound
∥∥∥ ˆ˜C(I− C˜)−1 − Cˆ(I−C)−1∥∥∥ ≤ 2
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B1 B2 B3 B4
v
1− r
1− r − ǫ
ǫ
r r 1 1
1
Figure 2: The initial configuration, banks are in blue, external shareholders are in green, and the
asset is shown in red.
The multiplicative bound of ǫ/r in Theorem 1 is much weaker than the bound of ǫ in the
acyclic case (Corollary 1), as the minimum self-holdings approaches 0, this difference tends towards
infinity. This discrepancy is not a limitation of our proof, but arises as an artifact of the effect that
holdings cycles can have on the equity (and market) valuations of the institutions in the network.
In Theorem 2 we show that there exist networks where changing a single institution’s holdings
by ǫ results in a change of ǫ
2r+ 1−r
2
ǫ
‖D~p‖ in one of the institution’s market values, where r is the
minimum self-holdings in the network.
Theorem 2. There exist networks where ‖C− C˜‖ ≤ ǫ, and ‖~v − ~˜v‖ ≥ ǫ
2r+ 1−r
2
‖D~p‖, where
~v = Cˆ(I−C)−1D~p
and r = mini(
˜ˆ
Cii, Cˆii) is the minimum “self-holdings” of the financial institutions.
Proof. We exhibit an initial network in Figure 2 and its perturbation in Figure 3.
In Figure 2, the equity values for the banks satisfy
B1 = (1− r − ǫ)B2
B2 = v + (1− r)B1
B3 = ǫB2
B4 = 0
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B1 B2 B3 B4
v
1− r
1− r − ǫ
ǫ
r r 1 1
1
Figure 3: The perturbed configuration, where one link of weight ǫ has been moved from B3 to B4.
So
B2 = v + (1− r)B1
= v + (1− r)(1− r − ǫ)B2
= v + (1− r − ǫ− r + r2 + rǫ)B2
Rearranging gives
B2 = v + (1− r − ǫ− r + r
2 + rǫ)B2
⇓
v = (2r + ǫ− r2 − rǫ)B2
⇓
B2 =
v
2r + ǫ− r2 − rǫ
=
v
r(2− r) + (1− r)ǫ
≥
1
2
(
v
r + 1−r2 ǫ
)
Thus the market valuation of B3 is ǫB2 which is at least
1
2
(
ǫv
r+ 1−r
2
ǫ
)
.
If the link from B2 → B3 were moved to B2 → B4 (as in Figure 3) then B3’s value drops to
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zero and B4’s value increases to ǫB2.
Thus the change in ℓ1 norm of the market valuations between the two situations is at least
ǫv
r + 1−r2 ǫ
Writing this in matrix notation, we have
C =


0 1− r − ǫ 0 0
1− r 0 0 0
0 ǫ 0 0
0 0 0 0


C˜ =


0 1− r − ǫ 0 0
1− r 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 ǫ 0 0


Cˆ = ˆ˜C =


r 0 0 0
0 r 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1


Note that increasing one link by ǫ and decreasing another by ǫ is actually a change in 2ǫ in the
‖C − Cˆ‖. Letting ǫ′ = ǫ2 , we have a change of ǫ in ‖C − Cˆ‖ yields a change of at most
ǫ
2r+ 1−r
2
ǫ
.
Notice that as r → 0, this is approaches 2, i.e., the resulting valuation is as far as possible in terms
of the ℓ1 norm of the market values of the institutions.
The type of equity amplification necessary for the lower bound in Theorem 2 cannot happen in
an acyclic network (see Corollary 1).
Now, we compare the upper and lower bounds on sensitivity. We have an upper bound of
max(2, ǫ
r
) and a lower bound of ǫ
2r+ 1−r
2
ǫ
. The lower bound implies the following.
• For any ǫ, δ > 0, there exists an r with 0 < r < 1 and a network with minimum reserve r
such that a change in edge weights of ǫ can lead to a change in market valuations of at least
(1− δ)2. Thus the upper bound cannot be decreased below 2.
• For any r, δ, with 0 < r < 1, and 0 < δ there exists an ǫ with 0 < ǫ < 1 and a network with
minimum reserve r such that a change in edge weights of ǫ can lead to a change in market
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valuations of at least (1− δ) ǫ2r , thus the upper bound cannot be decreased below
ǫ
2r .
Together, these show that the upper bound cannot be decreased below max(2, ǫ2r ), so our upper
bound of max(2, ǫ
r
) is essentially tight. Another interpretation of the lower bound is that for any
n > 0, there exists an ǫ, r > 0 and a network such that an ǫ change in one edge weight can cause a
multiplicative change of nǫ in market malues of the institutions.
6 Bank failures
6.1 Losses caused by failure
The model of [EGJ14] includes a notion of “failure,” whereby institutions whose market value
drops below a certain critical threshold suffer a further (discontinuous) loss in market value. These
discontinuous penalties capture the notion that if an institution cannot pay its operating costs, it
may see a further drop in revenues. Similarly, if confidence in the institution is shaken, and its debt
rating is downgraded, it may see spike in the cost of capital, and hence see a further drop in value.
These discontinuous penalties are operationalized by a threshold value
¯
vi, such that if institution
i’s market value, vi, drops below
¯
vi then it incurs a failure cost and its market value drops by an
additional βi(~p).
Defining Ivi<
¯
vi to be the indicator variable which is 1 if vi < ¯
vi and 0 otherwise, and bi(~v, ~p) =
βi(~p)Ivi<
¯
vi , the market value of the institutions satisfies the equation
~v = Cˆ(I−C)−1(D~p −~b(~v)) (3)
Compare Equation 3 to the linear system given by Equation 2. The introduction of non-linear
terms into the model adds significant complexity to the dynamics of the system, and can lead to
failure cascades. One of the primary goals of [EGJ14] was to characterize what network features
affect the likelihood and severity of failure cascades.
6.2 Overview of our complexity results
Suppose a regulator has complete information about a financial network, including all cross-holdings
and the prices of all underlying assets. Further, suppose that at equilibrium, this network has no
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failures. If the regulator believes that tomorrow, asset prices may drop by some fixed amount d,
(i.e., the sum total of asset prices may drop by d, but the exact drop of each asset price is unknown),
what is the maximum number failures that could occur as a result of this drop? In other words,
tomorrow, when the new equilibrium is calculated based on the new, lower, asset prices, what is
the maximum number of banks that could have failed?
Our primary result is that the introduction of discontinuous failure costs increases the com-
putational complexity of calculating basic network dynamics. If the complete network, as well as
the price of all underlying assets is known, then the number of failures can be computed efficiently
[EGJ14, Section 3.2.3]. If, on the other hand, there is some uncertainty in the prices (or future
prices) of the underlying assets, calculating the maximum number of failures that could occur in
the network is computationally intractable.
Thus we address the following question: given a stable network (where no banks have failed), if
the total prices of the assets drop by some small amount, what is the maximum number of failures
that occur at equilibrium? One potential complication is that in networks with discontinuous failure
penalties, there may not be a unique equilibrium, and hence the number of failures may not be
uniquely defined. To address this, for any fixed set of asset prices, we use standard practice and
only consider the “best-case” equilibrium (the one with fewest failures). On the other hand, we
consider the worst drop in asset prices (i.e., the drop in asset prices that causes the most failures in
its best-case equilibrium). Thus the “maximum” number of failures means the maximum over all
bounded drops in asset values, of the minimum number failures that could occur at this each fixed
drop in asset values (i.e., the minimum over all equilibria at these new, lower values). We discuss
the issue of multiple equilibria in more detail in Section 6.3.
In real-world financial networks, regulators, as well as the institutions themselves routinely
perform “stress-tests” to assess the robustness of the network to financial shocks. Our results
indicate that there are financial networks where no (computationally feasible) stress test, will ever
be able to even approximate the maximum number of failures that could occur from some small
shock to the system.
Note, however, that our results are not probabilistic, in the sense that we do not model the
probability of a specific drop in asset prices, instead we just impose a bound on the magnitude of
the total drop in asset values. Without assigning probability distributions to the asset prices, we
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cannot assess the probability that such a cascade could occur, only that it is feasible. Thus our
question is whether there exists a small specific drop in asset prices that could cause a huge failure
cascade – whether this drop is probable is outside the scope of our model. Thus, if a stress-test
could accurately model the probability distribution of asset prices, it may be able to assess the
likely number of failures caused by a shock to the system, but any computationally feasible stress
test will not be able to identify whether a small (but possibly unlikely) shock to the system could
cause a far greater failure cascade.
6.3 Multiple equilibria
When discontinuous failure penalties (~b(~v)) are introduced into the system, then there may be
multiple equilibrium values for the institutions in the system, i.e., the market values may not be
uniquely defined [EGJ14, Section 2.6 and Appendix A.7]. As noted [EGJ14], there are two distinctly
different ways a network can have multiple equilibria. The first type falls into the standard theory of
bank runs [DD83], and this type of multiplicity can occur even in an acyclic network. For example
suppose there is a network consisting of single institution holding a single asset of value p. Let v
denote the value of the institution and v denote its failure threshold, and β its failure penalty. If
p > v > p− β, then a valuation of v = p, and v = p− β are both consistent with Equation 3. The
second type of multiplicity is caused by cycles in the network. See Figure 4 for a simple (cyclic)
network that has multiple equilibria.
In a network with multiple equilibria, we can talk about the “best-case” equilibrium (the one
with the fewest failures) and the “worst-case” equilibrium (the one with the most failures). As in
[EGJ14], we focus on the best-case equilibrium, thus when we refer to the “the number of failures”
we mean the number of failures in the best-case equilibrium.
6.4 The Balanced Complete Bipartite Subgraph (BCBS) problem
Our hardness result is based on the hardness of finding a maximum balanced clique in a bipartite
graph. This is known as Balanced Complete Bipartite Subgraph (BCBS) problem.
Definition 1 (BCBS). Given a bipartite graph G = (V1, V2, E) with |V1| = |V2| = n, the Balanced
Complete Bipartite Subgraph (BCBS) problem is to find the largest integer K such that there exists
19
1 1
B1 B2
1 1
1
2
1
2
1/2
1/2
Figure 4: Banks are in blue, external shareholders are in green, and the asset is shown in red. In
this example D~p =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, and C =
[
0 12
1
2 0
]
. If
¯
vi = 2, and bi = 1, then two equilibria are:
~v =
[
1
1
]
, and ~v =
[
0
0
]
sets C1 ⊂ V1 and C2 ⊂ V2 with the properties that |C1| = |C2| = K, and the induced graph on
C1 ∪C2 is a complete bipartite subgraph of G.
The BCBS problem is known to be NP-hard [GJ79, Joh87]. This provides strong evidence that
there is no scalable algorithm that it that can find the size of the maximum balanced clique in a
bipartite graph.
In fact, there is significant evidence that even approximating the size of the largest balanced
clique is hard. Feige showed that for some δ > 0 it is Random 3-SAT hard to approximate BCBS
to within a factor of nδ [Fei02, Theorem 3].
Feige and Kogan showed that if BCBS can be approximated to within a factor of 2(log n)
δ
for
every δ > 0 then 3-SAT can be solved in time 2n
3/4+ǫ for every ǫ > 0 [FK04, Theorem 1.3].
Feige and Kogan go on to conjecture that for some δ > 0, there is no polynomial-time algorithm
to approximate BCBS to within a factor of nδ [FK04, Conjecture 1.1].
Our primary hardness result shows that there are networks where calculating the maximum
number of bank failures that can result from a small shock is equivalent to solving the BCBS
problem. Thus there are financial networks where even approximately estimating the number of
bank failures that can result from an arbitrarily small drop in asset prices is a computationally
intractable problem.
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6.5 The complexity of calculating the maximum number of failures
In this section, we give our main result concerning the computational complexity of estimating the
maximum number of failures that can occur given a small drop in values of the underlying assets.
In particular, this hardness result applies finding the number of failures that occur at equilibrium
when the institutional cross-holdings are fixed, and completely known, but there is some small
uncertainty in the prices of the underlying assets.
In the situation that the cross-holdings and the assets are fixed, it is straightforward to calculate
the market values of the institutions at equilibrium [EGJ14, Section 3.2.3]. Note that the network
we construct is acyclic.
Theorem 3. For every bipartite graph G on 2n nodes, and every ǫ > 0, there is a financial network
with Ω(n) institutions, and a d > 0 such that computing the maximum number of institutions that
could fail following a shock of dǫ in asset prices is as hard as solving the BCBS problem in G.
Proof. Let ℓ > 0 be any integer.
Our starting point is the following hardness result for the BCBS problem. Given an n × n
balanced bipartite graph G, it is hard to decide whether the largest balanced bipartite clique size
in G is at least K ×K or at most K/g ×K/g for some gap function g. For instance, g = 2(log n)
δ
under the assumption that 3-SAT 6∈ DTIME
(
2n
3/4+ǫ
)
for some ǫ > 0.
Given an n×n balanced bipartite graph G, we will construct a financial network with (2 + ℓ)n
institutions such that if G has a balanced bipartite subgraph of size K, then a drop in asset prices
by Kǫ can cause at least (2 + ℓ)K failures. On the other hand, if the largest balanced bipartite
subgraph of G is of size K
g
, a drop in asset prices of Kǫ can cause at most K + K
g
(ℓ+ 1) failures.
This shows that estimating the maximum number of failures induced by a fixed drop in asset
prices is at least as hard as estimating the size of the maximum balanced bipartite clique. Without
loss of generality, we assume that every vertex in G has degree at least K.
Let D denote the maximum degree of any vertex in G. Let 0 < ǫ < 1 be an arbitrary parameter,
and let 0 < r < 1 denote the minimum amount of self-holdings of the institutions in the network
we are constructing. (The reduction will hold for any choices of 0 < ǫ, r < 1.)
For each node in the graph G, we will associate a financial institution. Let institutions 1, . . . , n
correspond to the left-hand nodes of G, and institutions n+1, . . . , 2n correspond to the right-hand
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nodes of G.
We will also generate n underlying assets, labelled a′i, . . . , a
′
n and institution i will complete
own asset a′i for i = 1, . . . , n. Institutions n+ 1, . . . , 2n will own none of the underlying assets. All
assets will initially be valued at 1. Thus
D =


1
. . .
1
0
. . .
0


Define N = D1−r (recall D is the maximum degree of G, and r is an arbitrary parameter that
will determine the integration of the resulting financial network). We will use Γ(j) to denote the
neighbors of vertex j in G. Notice that our definition of N ensures that
1− r =
D
N
≥
|Γ(j)|
N
for all j = 1, . . . , 2n. This means that if institution j sells an equal 1
N
stake in itself to all of its
neighbors, it will be left with at least an r fraction of self ownership. To operationalize this, we
define
cij =


1
N
if i > j and (i, j) an edge of G
0 otherwise
For 1 = 1, . . . , n let
¯
vi = 1−
|Γ(i)|
N
−ǫ, so if institution i’s asset drops in value by ǫ then institution
i will fail. Let the failure penalty βi = 1−
|Γ(i)|
N
− ǫ for i = 1, . . . , n. Thus if asset i drops in price
by ǫ, institution i fails and its value immediately drops to 0. For i = n+ 1, . . . , 2n let
¯
vi =
|Γ(i)|−d
N
.
Notice that if all assets are initially valued at 1 then
vi =


1− |Γ(i)|
N
if 1 ≤ i ≤ n
|Γ(i)|
N
if n < i ≤ 2n
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This financial network has the following properties:
1. If j > n and d of bank j’s neighbors fail, i.e., d of the assets ai (i ∈ Γ(j)) drop in value by ǫ,
then bank j will fail.
2. If j > n and the total drop in value of bank j’s neighbors is less than d
N
then bank j will not
fail.
Now, we examine the properties of this system when the assets are allowed to drop in price by
total amount dǫ. A drop of dǫ can always cause d institutions on the left-hand side of the network
to fail, simply by dropping the value of each of their assets by ǫ.
What happens if the price drop is not concentrated among exactly d assets? Let t denote the
number of assets that drop in value by at least ǫ. If t < d, then at least tǫ from the “shock budget”
of dǫ was used to lower the price of these t assets, which leaves a budget of (d − t)ǫ remaining.
Now, consider how much this drop can affect one of a right-hand institutions, j. Even if this drop
is concentrated entirely among the left-hand neighbors of j, the drop j feels is at most
1
N
(t+ (d− t)ǫ) <
1
N
(t+ (d− t)) =
d
N
Thus institution j cannot fail, since the failure of a right-hand institution requires a drop in value
of at least d
N
. This means that in this case exactly t < d institutions fail. Since we are interested
in the maximum number of failures that can arise from a drop in asset value of dǫ, we can, without
loss of generality, assume that exactly d assets drop in value by ǫ, causing exactly d failures among
the left-hand institutions.
Now, suppose there is a biclique of size K in G. If d = K, then causing d failures among the
left-hand members of this biclique will cause d = K failures among the right-hand members.
On the other hand, suppose the largest biclique is of size K
g
. If the failure of d left-hand
institutions causes the failure of P right-hand institutions, then each of the P failed institutions on
the right must be connected to each of the d failed institutions on the left. Thus there must be a
biclique of size min(d, P ) = P .
Thus in the “yes” case (G has a biclique of size K) we can cause at least K right hand failures
with a failure budget of Kǫ. In the “no” case (the largest biclique in G is of size K/g) the maximum
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number of failures of right-hand institutions is bounded by K
g
.
Now, to amplify this discrepancy, we add a chain of ℓ institutions connected to each right hand
institution. Thus for every right-hand institution, bi, it will have a chain of institutions b
(1)
i , . . . , b
(ℓ)
i
where b
(j)
i owns a 1 − r fraction of b
(j−1)
i and has no other holdings. Thus if bi fails, then b
(1)
i
through b
(ℓ)
i fail as well (see Figure 5).
This new network has (ℓ+ 2)n banks, and has the following properties. Given a failure budget
of Kǫ, if the largest balanced clique in G is a K×K, a drop in value by Kǫ causes at most (2+ℓ)K,
but if the largest biclique is of size K
g
, then a drop in asset values of at most Kǫ can cause at most
K + (ℓ+ 1)K
g
= (g + ℓ+ 1)K
g
failures.
Note that when the gap, g = nδ, choosing ℓ = poly(n), we obtain a gap of ((ℓ+2)n)δ
′
for some
δ′ < δ.
Applying a result of [FK04], we obtain the following Corollary.
Corollary 2. If 3-SAT 6∈ DTIME
(
2n
3/4+ǫ
)
for some ǫ > 0, then there exists a δ > 0 such that
there is no polynomial time algorithm that can calculate the maximum number of failures in a
financial network caused by a drop in asset prices of dǫ to within a factor of 2(logn)
δ′
for some
δ′ > 0.
7 Conclusion
This work highlights two distinct sources of instability in financial networks, instability arising
from fluctuations in cross-holdings and instability arising from fluctuations in asset prices. More
specifically, we show that there are networks where small fluctuations in cross-holdings or asset
prices can have striking consequences, and these consequences have numerous implications.
Our first result (Corollary 1, Theorems 1, 2) shows that the effect of small changes in cross-
holdings is strongly tied to the integration of the network. In highly integrated networks small
changes in cross-holdings can have potentially unbounded effects on market valuations, while in
networks with low integration, changes in cross-holdings have more tightly bounded effects on
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a′1 a1
1
b1 b
(1)
1
· · · b
(ℓ)
1
1− r 1− r1− r
a′2 a2
1
b2 b
(1)
2
· · · b
(ℓ)
2
1− r 1− r1− r
a′3 a3
1
b3 b
(1)
3
· · · b
(ℓ)
3
1− r 1− r1− r
...
...
...
...
...
a′n−2 an−2
1
bn−2 b
(1)
n−2
· · · b
(ℓ)
n−2
1− r 1− r1− r
a′n−1 an−1
1
bn−1 b
(1)
n−1
· · · b
(ℓ)
n−1
1− r 1− r1− r
a′n an
1
bn b
(1)
n b
(ℓ)
n
· · ·
1− r 1− r 1− r
Figure 5: There are n assets, {a′i}, shown in red. Each asset a
′
i is fully owned by institution
ai. Institutions {ai}, {bi} correspond to a hard instance of balanced bipartite clique. Institutions{
b
(j)
i
}
serve to amplify the failures that occur in the first level.
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the market values of the institutions in the network. These results can be interpreted in many
ways. From a regulatory perspective, in a highly integrated network, any regulator must know the
entire cross-holdings network to a very high degree of accuracy in order effectively understand the
market values of the institutions. From an institution’s perspective, small changes in investment
by individual institutions can have their effects greatly magnified throughout the network. From a
predictivity perspective, if one wishes to forecast market values into the future, any small forecasting
uncertainty in the cross-holdings can have enormous effects on the (predicted) market values of
the institutions. From a privacy perspective, institutions cannot maintain any privacy in their
investment portfolios without compromising the ability of outsiders (e.g. other institutions, outside
investors or regulators) to calculate the market value of the institutions. These problems arise only
in highly integrated networks (Theorem 1), and they can all be mitigated by imposing a cap on
integration. If institutions are required to maintain some fixed percentage of their ownership outside
of the network, the sensitivity to changes in cross-holdings can be drastically reduced.
Our second result shows that small changes in the prices of the underlying assets can have
unpredictable effects on the number of failures in the system. Specifically, we show that there are
networks where it is computationally intractable, even with perfect information about the cross-
holdings, to estimate the number of failures that can occur after some small drop in asset prices.
This result too can be interpreted from different perspectives. This result implies that a regula-
tor (with perfect information about the network cross-holdings) who believes there may be some
bounded fluctuation in asset prices cannot be expected to distinguish a network where these fluctu-
ations cause a small number of failures, from a network where fluctuations of the same magnitude
can cause a massive number of failures. Institutions face the same computational challenge. An
institution may wonder whether its investment portfolio will protect it from a bounded shock in
asset prices, and our results show that even with complete information about the investments of
all other agents in the system, it may be infeasible to determine whether a specific portfolio is safe.
Previous works have imposed specific probabilistic models on fluctuations in asset prices, and for
a given probabilistic model the number of failures can usually be estimated. But what if the model
is incorrect (e.g. the asset prices do not fluctuate independently)? Our results show that there are
situations where changes in the distribution of fluctuations (but not their overall magnitude) can
have huge and unpredictable effects on the number of failures.
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Moving forward, it is an important research question to understand what constraints on the
network will allow institutions and regulators to perform these stability analyses.
References
[ABBG10] Sanjeev Arora, Boaz Barak, Markus Brunnermeier, and Rong Ge. Computational Com-
plexity and Information Asymmetry in Financial Products. In ICS, pages 49–65. Ts-
inghua University Press, 2010.
[ABBG11] Sanjeev Arora, Boaz Barak, Markus Brunnermeier, and Rong Ge. Computational Com-
plexity and Information Asymmetry in Financial Products. Commun. ACM, 54(5):101–
107, May 2011.
[AG98] Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale. Optimal Financial Crises. The Journal of Finance,
53(4):1245–1284, August 1998.
[AG00] Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale. Financial Contagion. Journal of Political Economy,
108(1):1+, February 2000.
[AOTS13] Daron Acemoglu, Asuman Ozdaglar, and Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi. Systemic risk and
stability in financial networks. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research,
2013.
[BBC89] Francesco Brioschi, Luigi Buzzacchi, and Massimo G. Colombo. Risk capital financing
and the separation of ownership and control in business groups. Journal of Banking &
Finance, 13(4-5):747–772, September 1989.
[BEK+11] Lawrence Blume, David Easley, Jon Kleinberg, Robert Kleinberg, and E´va Tardos.
Which networks are least susceptible to cascading failures? In FOCS, pages 393–402.
IEEE, October 2011.
[BP14] Mark Braverman and Kanika Pasricha. The Computational Hardness of Pricing Com-
pound Options. In ITCS ’14, pages 103–104. ACM, 2014.
27
[DD83] D. Diamond and P. Dybvig. Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity. The Journal
of Political Economy, pages 401–419, 1983.
[DMNS06] Cynthia Dwork, Frank McSherry, Kobbi Nissim, and Adam Smith. Calibrating Noise
to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis Theory of Cryptography. In Shai Halevi and Tal
Rabin, editors, TCC, volume 3876, pages 265–284. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2006.
[Dwo06] Cynthia Dwork. Differential Privacy. In ICALP ’06, volume 4052, pages 1–12. Springer,
2006.
[EGJ14] Matthew Elliott, Benjamin Golub, and Matthew O. Jackson. Financial Networks and
Contagion. American Economic Review, 104(10):3115–3153, 2014.
[EN01] Larry Eisenberg and Thomas H. Noe. Systemic Risk in Financial Systems. Management
Science, 47(2):236–249, February 2001.
[Fei02] Uriel Feige. Relations Between Average Case Complexity and Approximation Complex-
ity. In STOC ’02, pages 534–543. ACM, 2002.
[FHT94] M. Fedenia, J. E. Hodder, and A. J. Triantis. Cross-holdings: estimation issues, biases,
and distortions. Review of Financial Studies, 7(1):61–96, January 1994.
[FK04] Uriel Feige and Shimon Kogan. Hardness of approximation of the Balanced Complete
Bipartite Subgraph problem. Technical Report MCS04-04, Weizmann Institute of Sci-
ence, 2004.
[FKOS13] Mark Flood, Jonathan Katz, Stephen Ong, and Adam Smith. Cryptography and
the Economics of Supervisory Information:Balancing Transparency and Condentiality.
Technical Report 0011, Office of Financial Research, September 2013.
[FP91] Kenneth R. French and James M. Poterba. Were Japanese stock prices too high?
Journal of Financial Economics, 29(2):337–363, October 1991.
[GHM12] C. Gourie´roux, J. C. He´am, and A. Monfort. Bilateral exposures and systemic solvency
risk expositions bilate´rales et risque syste´mique pour la solvabilite´. Canadian Journal
of Economics/Revue canadienne d’e´conomique, 45(4):1273–1309, November 2012.
28
[GJ79] Michael R Gary and David S Johnson. Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the
Theory of NP-completeness. WH Freeman and Company, New York, 1979.
[GK10] Prasanna Gai and Sujit Kapadia. Contagion in financial networks. Proceedings of
the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Science, 466(2120):2401–
2423, August 2010.
[GY14] Paul Glasserman and H. Peyton Young. How likely is contagion in financial networks?
Journal of Banking & Finance, February 2014.
[Joh82] Charles R. Johnson. Inverse M-matrices. Linear Algebra and its Applications, 47:195–
216, 1982.
[Joh87] David S Johnson. The np-completeness column: An ongoing guide. Journal of algo-
rithms, 8(3):438–448, 1987.
[Mor00] Stephen Morris. Contagion. Review of Economic Studies, 67(1):57–78, 2000.
[NPH14] Arjun Narayan, Antonis Papadimitriou, and Andreas Haeberlen. Compute globally, act
locally: Protecting federated systems from systemic threats. In Proceedings of the 10th
Workshop on Hot Topics in System Dependability (HotDep’14), October 2014.
[PB74] George Poole and Thomas Boullion. A Survey on M-Matrices. SIAM Review, 16(4):419–
427, 1974.
[Wil77] R. A. Willoughby. The inverse M-matrix problem. Linear Algebra and its Applications,
18(1):75–94, 1977.
29
Appendix
A A flow model of the system
It is often instructive to create a stochastic matrix representing the system, which models money
flowing through the network.
There are n financial institutions, and we introduce n addition entities, the “shareholders.” In
this model shareholder i owns a Cˆii fraction of institution i and has no other financial ties to the
system. This defines a 2n× 2n matrix, A, defined as
A =

 C 0
Cˆ I


The augmented matrix A is now column stochastic, i.e., its columns sum to 1. The ijth entry
of the matrix A represents the fraction of “agent” j owned by agent i. There are 2n agents
because there are n financial institutions (agents 1, . . . , n) and n collections of shareholders (agents
n + 1, . . . , 2n). The lower right corner of A is the identity matrix because the shareholders are
completely self-owned. The columns of A sum to one because for each agent, j, its entire value is
owned by the other financial institutions or the external shareholders.
Initially, the banks are assumed to have some intrinsic value D~p, which indicates the value of
underlying assets owned by each institution. Without loss of generality, we will assume that all
assets are completely owned by the institutions in the network (otherwise, we can simply rescale
the value of each asset). This assumption is equivalent to saying that D is column stochastic.
The 2n× 2n matrix A allows us to view the market valuations of each institution as the steady
state of a dynamical process. Money flows into the system from the underlying assets, and at
each time step, the value residing in each financial institution is distributed to its stakeholders
according to their stake. This process terminates when all the money in the system (coming from
the underlying assets) has been distributed to the external shareholders. Algebraically, this process
can be viewed as follows: given a vector ~W ∈ R2n, where Wi denotes the value of the underlying
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assets owned by i, for i = 1, . . . , n and Wi = 0 for n < i ≤ 2n, then
lim
t→∞
At ~W = lim
t→∞
At

 ~w
~0

 =

 ~0
~v

 =


0
...
0
v1
...
vn


(4)
where vi will denote the market value of institution i, i.e., vi is the value of institution i owned by
its external shareholders. Now, basic linear algebra tells us that
At =

 Ct 0
Cˆ
(
Ct−1 +Ct−2 + · · ·+ I
)
I


Throughout this work, we will use the standard operator norm for a matrix (in the L1 sense),
‖A‖ = ‖A‖1 = sup
~x
‖A~x‖1
‖~x‖1
.
Because the columns of A sum to one, we have ‖A~x‖1 = ‖~x‖1 for any ~x. In particular, this
means that ∥∥∥∥∥∥∥A

 D~p
~0


∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
= ‖~p‖1 (5)
This is the algebraic statement that the total market value of all the institutions is exactly the
total value of the underlying assets in the system.
To analyze equation 4 we recall the standard fact about matrix series
Lemma 2. If C is a matrix with ‖C‖ < 1, then I−C is invertible and
(I −C)−1 =
∞∑
k=0
Ck
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Proof. First, note if ~v 6= ~0, then ‖C~v‖ < ‖~v‖, so
‖(I −C)~v‖ ≥ ‖I~v‖ − ‖C~v‖ > 0
so I−C has a trivial kernel, and hence is invertible.
Then, the result follows just as in the scalar case: Letting S =
∑N
k=0C
k, we have S(I −C) =
I−CN+1. Thus
N∑
k=0
Ck = (I−C)−1(I −CN+1)
Letting N →∞, and noting that CN+1 → 0 gives the result.
This leads to the closed formula used in [EGJ14]:
~v = Cˆ(I−C)−1D~p (6)
Where the n×1 vector ~p represents the values of the underlying assets and the vector ~v represents the
market value of the financial institutions (as measured by their external shareholders). Equations
4 and 5 then tell us that ‖D~p‖1 = ‖~p‖1 = ‖~v‖1, which is just the simple statement that the total
value of the agents is the same as the total value of the underlying assets, in other words value is
never created or destroyed by the network.
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